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Notice to Tenants in Foreclosure
I. INTRODUCTION
Maria Simmons and her husband Kenneth fell prey to a
landlord in East Providence who let them move into one of his
rental homes in a middle-class neighborhood. 1 "When I get back,"
Maria recalled him saying, "we'll write out some kind of lease."
Only a month later, a neighbor approached her and told her about
a foreclosure notice she spotted in the newspaper. 2 The landlord,
Charles Oertel, bought the property in September 2004 for
$233,000, his tenth rental property secured with "risky subprime
loans" with partner William Prunty. 3 Oertel had a "30-year
mortgage that carried an initial interest rate of 6.53 percent,
which was scheduled to adjust two years later to a maximum of
9.53 percent. 4 Thereafter the rate would adjust every six months
to a maximum of 12.53 percent."' 5 All of Oertel's other properties
had been foreclosed on by the time Mrs. Simmons' home was
advertised for foreclosure, due in part to the rapidly increasing
mortgage payments required for the properties and the inability of
rental income to keep up. 6 As Oertel put it, "You start robbing
Peter to pay Paul."' 7 The Simmons's were lucky enough to find
stable, suitable replacement housing upon their eviction, 8 but
1. Lynn Arditi, Foreclosure Fallout, PROVIDENCE J. BULL. (R.I.), Jan. 6,
2008, at D1, available at 2008 WLNR 416231 [hereinafter Fallout].
2. Id. The bank sent the notice of foreclosure to the landlord the day
after the Simmons's moved in.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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there is nothing preventing what had happened to them with
Oertel from happening again with another landlord.
What happens to the tenants in foreclosed homes? They, like
the borrower, must vacate the property when the bank reclaims
its possessory interest and subsequently sells the property to
fulfill the outstanding debt. The tenant, however, is typically the
last to know that a default has occurred and that a foreclosure
sale is imminent. "[T]hey are caught unaware: 'The first thing
they know is there's some people standing out in the front yard
auctioning off the property [ ... ] And the next day they've got a
five-day notice to vacate."'9 Tenants are not entitled to any notice
of foreclosure in Rhode Island, though they can be sure to receive
notice of eviction from the bank, requiring that they vacate within
a "reasonable" amount of time. 10 Although notices of foreclosure
are printed in the Providence Journal as required by law, 11 with
the increased volume of foreclosure advertisements and the
expectation of personal notice from a landlord, most tenants do
not expect to see a notice, nor are they looking. Note that Rhode
Island landlord-tenant law does not apply in foreclosure
situations. 12
This phenomenon has the potential to affect all tenants,
whether under a lease or not and whether up to date on rent or
not. Renters cannot be assured that their monthly payments are
going toward the property's mortgage or included utilities, nor can
they be assured that the unit they are renting is not already in
foreclosure proceedings. Seventy-nine year old Providence renter
Irene Foss found herself in this situation last year. 13 She was a
tenant in good standing, renting part of a triple-decker that
housed six other adults and seven children. 14 The home's water
had been shut off, prompting an inquiry into the property owner's
water and mortgage delinquency.1 5 Realizing that the property
9. Lynn Arditi, Collateral Damage: Foreclosure crisis forces many
renters from homes, PROVIDENCE J. BULL. (R.I.), Nov. 25, 2007, at D1,
available at 2007 WLNR 23443290 (quoting Robert M. Sabel, Rhode Island
Legal Services' litigation director) [hereinafter Collateral Damage].
10. Collateral Damage, supra note 9.
11. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-27-4(a) (1956).
12. Collateral Damage, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Mrs. Foss and her neighbors had to pay to have the water turned
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would be going up for foreclosure auction after a neighbor had
fortuitously spotted a foreclosure notice in the paper, Irene hoped
that the new owner might want to keep the current tenants. 16 At
the unsuccessful bank auction, Mrs. Foss approached the
auctioneer and mentioned that the landlord had showed one of the
vacant apartments to a prospective tenant just a week earlier, at
which time the auctioneer advised her not to make anymore rental
payments. 17 Not all tenants are as lucky as Mrs. Foss. Most do
not get any advice about continuing rental payments, nor do most
get a heads up that they might be signing a lease for a unit that is
already in default, like Maria Simmons.
A. "Something wicked this way comes"1 8
How can these harmful effects be prevented? Several
problems converge to create the mess, but by teasing out the
specific effects of foreclosure on tenants, one solution is perfectly
clear. If only tenants had some way of knowing that they are in
for tough times, that they are going to be put out, that they should
start looking now for new housing and that they should stop
paying rent on their doomed apartment. Landlords have made it
apparent that they are not to be relied upon to provide this
warning to their tenants: recall that Mrs. Foss's landlord and
Charles Oertel knew that they were in foreclosure, but failed to
notify the people to whom it would matter most, their tenants.
The only other party with the information and the means to warn
the tenants is the bank. Lenders can be counted on to notify
borrowing landlords, their customers, that they are in default and
that foreclosure proceedings will be commenced soon. Why
shouldn't they also be expected to notify the home's occupants of
the foreclosure as well? It is cheap, it is easy, and it is in their
back on, resulting in a payment in addition to their monthly rent payments.
In Mrs. Foss's situation, as in many others', the landlord was responsible for
paying water and sewer bills, not the tenants. When the landlord takes rent,
but fails to pay the mortgage and/or promised utilities, the tenants end up
paying out the nose. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Note that so long as the borrower is still the record titleholder, he
is still the landlord and is entitled to rent. If the tenant stops paying rent,
but the foreclosure isn't consummated, the landlord may seek to recover the
unpaid rent from the tenant. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-56(c) (1956).
18. William Shakespeare, MacBeth act 4, sc. 1.
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best interests to do so.
Keeping these problems in mind, this note investigates and
ultimately proposes a notice requirement that would ensure that
mortgagees inform tenants in residential foreclosure situations of
the foreclosure sale. Part Two explores the factors that have
combined to create the foreclosure crisis that Rhode Island is
currently facing. Part Three examines the law of mortgage
foreclosure, with a brief common law overview followed by an
explanation of the mortgage foreclosure laws of Rhode Island.
Part Four probes the ways in which the Rhode Island courts could
read the proposed notice requirement into existing Rhode Island
law, looking specifically to jurisprudence in New Hampshire and
constitutional notice principles. Part Five studies the option of
creating the notice requirement via legislative change, mirroring
the laws of Minnesota that are currently being copied nationwide.
Finally, the note concludes by exploring the likelihood of change
and predicting the outcome of each proposed avenue to change.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Rhode Island Foreclosure Crisis
In Rhode Island, July of 2008 saw the number of legally
noticed foreclosures reach a "two-year high" of 422.19 Of the 372
foreclosure notices posted in Rhode Island in August 2008, fifty-
seven percent, or 211, were located in Providence, with fifty-two of
the August Providence foreclosures effected on multifamily
dwellings. 20 The state's mortgage delinquency rate for the second
quarter of 2008, at 6.37%, is higher than the national delinquency
rate of 6.22%.21 Subprime adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loans
accounted for 24.54% of second quarter foreclosures in Rhode
Island. 22 When coupled with the prediction that hundreds of
thousands of option ARM loans will adjust beginning in April
2009, this spells continued disaster, despite the potential decrease
19. See RHODE ISLAND HOUSING, STATEWIDE FORECLOSURE TRACKING:
SEPTEMBER 2008 1 (2008),
http://www.rhodeislandhousing.org/filelibrary/SeptO8%2OForeclosure.pdf
[hereinafter Tracking].
20. Id.
21. Id. at2.
22. Id.
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in subprime mortgage defaults. 2 3
Compounding the apparent foreclosure problem in Rhode
Island, specifically when looking at multifamily properties in
Providence, is the sky-high state unemployment rate of 9.4%,24
beating the national average of 7.2%.25 The forecast is gloomy,
with the highest unemployment rate in the nation combined with
almost 110 metropolitan multifamily foreclosures in the month of
August alone. Where is the state's housing problem headed, and
when will it end?
While the answers to these questions may not be clear as of
yet, one thing is clear: how the state's situation got to where it is.
The state's situation mirrors that which is found around the
nation. Tight lending practices slacked off with the falling
interest rates following the terrorist attacks of September 11th,
lowered in an effort to boost the economy. 26 A wide availability of
credit, often at rates below the prime interest rate, lured first-time
homebuyers, minorities, the elderly, and investors into snapping
up properties quickly and with little initial overhead. 27 This in
turn led to a housing boom that peaked in 2004.28 In 2004,
Providence home sales increased 20.43% from the previous year,
crushing the state sales increase of only 8.63%.29 More homes
were purchased in Providence that year than anywhere else in the
state, setting the city up for a real estate bust it may not have
seen coming. Now, many people owe more on their mortgages
23. Prashant Gopal, The Next Real Estate Crisis, Bus. WK., June 5, 2008,
available at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/lifestyle/content/un2008/bw2008065_526
168.htm.
24. December 2008 jobless figure. See U.S. BUREAu OF LAB. STAT.,
ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE: REGIONAL AND STATE EMPLOYMENT AND
UNEMPLOYMENT SUMMARY, November 21, 2008, available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/laus.nr0.htm.
25. December 2008 figure. See id.
26. Peggy J. Crawford & Terry Young, Will the Subprime Meltdown
Burst the Housing Bubble?, 10 GRAZiADIO BUSINESS REPORT, PEPP. U., no. 3,
2007, at 1, available at http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/073/housing.html.
27. For a general overview of predatory lending practices, see generally
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503 (2001-2002).
28. Kevin Shalvey, Multi-family homes in city hit hard by foreclosure,
Special Section: 2008 City of Providence, PROVIDENCE Bus. NEWS, July 21,
2008, available at http://www.pbn.com/detail/33868.html.
29. Id.
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than their house is worth 30 and can no longer make their adjusted
payments, which has led to the current foreclosure crisis.
B. Focus on Multifamily Property Foreclosure
Multifamily homes are hit especially hard. Often owned by
the investors, absentee landlords, minorities, and first-time
homebuyers 31 who signed on for doomed mortgages, 32 multifamily
homes are more likely to be subject to subprime or ARM loans,
which in turn are more likely to lead to higher foreclosure rates.
This simple link hints at a correlation between high foreclosure
rates for subprime and subprime ARMs and high foreclosure rates
for urban multifamily units. 33
The most distinguishing feature of multifamily properties in
the foreclosure context is the increased likelihood [or certainty]
that someone other than the owner/borrower occupies one or more
of the units. Unfortunately, when a foreclosure is completed on
these properties, is it not just the borrower who is ousted:
everyone residing therein is ousted, including tenants. This skews
the common foreclosure calculus by making one property's
foreclosure affect three or four families, rather than only one
family per property. The effects on the state, its cities, and their
neighborhoods are monumental and oftentimes undervalued.
"Foreclosures have a way of rotting neighborhoods like
cavities, from the inside out." 34 Foreclosures leaving renters
homeless or holding over in their wakes have several
consequences outside the scope of the property and renters
themselves. "Foreclosures cause intense damage to
30. Id.
31. See Jorge 0. Elorza, Landlords, Rent Control and Healthy
Gentrification: A Policy Proposal to Deconcentrate the Poor in Urban America,
17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 21 (Fall 2007).
32. Eggert, supra note 27, at 517.
33. RI second quarter foreclosure figures show that subprime ARMs
accounted for 24.54% of foreclosures, while non-ARM subprime loans
accounted for 15.44% of foreclosures. Of the 357 foreclosure notices issued in
the state of Rhode Island in August, about 109, just under 30 percent of the
total, were issued to multifamily homes in Providence. Tracking, supra note
19, at 2.
34. See Lynn Arditi, A Street Struggles in Providence; Borrowing
troubles, PROVIDENCE J. BULL. (R.I.), Oct. 5, 2008, at A, available at 2008
WLNR 18951337 [hereinafter Struggles].
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borrowers/homeowners completely distinct from the financial
effect of losing a house," 35 and this effect likely extends to the
tenant in foreclosure. Most notably, 'loss of foreclosure is not
limited to that suffered by the borrowers themselves, but also
spreads out in a rippling fashion, affecting the entire community."
36 Case in point: Bellevue Avenue in Providence's West End.3 7 It
depicts what is becoming a common scene in Providence and
across the country: "[o]nce abandoned, these homes have been
taken over by gangs and drug people, and they become breeding
places for crime." 38
Tenants who are evicted with little notice, especially in
foreclosure situations, are in danger of falling prey to scheming
landlords like Mrs. Foss's, or to less-than-honest landlords like
Charles Oertel. They lose work and money while searching for
new housing, and may accrue debt in the form of attorney's fees,
unpaid utility bills that they may or may not have been
responsible for in the first place, and wasted rent or 'use and
occupancy' fees"39 from holding over prior to an eviction.
This tends to perpetuate a cycle of poverty that gets
concentrated in one place. 40 Demographic, social, economic, and
political factors combine to isolate collections of like people in one
neighborhood or location, cutting them off from employment,
social, economic, and health opportunities available to other
classes or demographics. 4 1 Two sets of circumstances are likely to
exist, each posing a different outcome for the neighborhood's level
of concentrated poverty. First, if a middle-income tenant is forced
out of a unit due to foreclosure, he is likely to have the means to
move to a better neighborhood, and he will bring with him the
benefits of mixed-income neighborhoods. 4 2 Second, if a lower
income, demographically homogeneous tenant is ousted by a
foreclosure, he is likely to stay in the neighborhood, close to public
35. Eggert, supra note 27, at 581.
36. Id. at 582.
37. Struggles, supra note 34.
38. Eggert, supra note 27, at 582 (quoting Richard M. Daley, mayor of
Chicago, as reported by James T. Berger, Subprime Lending Produces
Dangerous Side-Effects, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 9, 2000).
39. Fallout, supra note 1.
40. Elorza, supra note 31, at 5-6.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 12-16.
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transport, ethnic groups, and failing schools. 43
III. FORECLOSURE LAW
A. Generally
Common Law Foreclosure Principles
In order to explore a policy change in the field of mortgage
foreclosure notices, it is imperative to have a loose understanding
of how the foreclosure process works. By examining the general
common law principles of mortgage foreclosures, the Rhode Island
laws and processes will become clearer. Every state has different
statutorily enumerated procedures for mortgage foreclosures, but
there are several common strands regardless of state statute.
1. Right of Redemption
Every mortgage involves an equitable right of redemption for
the borrower, and many of the United States jurisdictions
recognize a statutory right of redemption in mortgages. 44 A right
of redemption is a right held by the mortgagor to own the property
outright, provided certain conditions of the mortgage are met.45
When referring to mortgage foreclosure, it is technically this right
of redemption that is being foreclosed upon, not the mortgage
agreement itself.4 6 The foreclosure action serves to sever the
right of redemption, as described below.
The right of redemption exists in two forms, one equitable and
the other statutory. The equitable right of redemption exists in
almost every mortgage agreement, provided that no other
arrangement has been made between borrower and lender on this
point. 47 Once a foreclosure is enacted on these mortgages, the
equitable right of redemption is extinguished, as the borrower has
43. Id. at 6.
44. Caryl A. Yzenbaard, Payment or Non-Payment and Foreclosure,
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS DATABASE, Sept. 2005, at §4:37,
available at RRET § 4:37.
45. Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An
Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 229, 231
(1998).
46. Id.
47. See Yzenbaard, supra note 44, at n.65.
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failed to fulfill the conditions of the mortgage. 48 Statutory rights
of redemption provide a certain period of time, typically running
from the start of the foreclosure process, in which the borrower
may pay the outstanding loan plus costs and redeem title to the
property.49 Once the statutorily prescribed period ends, there is
no further chance for the borrower to redeem. 50
Two Means of Foreclosing the Right of Redemption
1. Power of Sale, or Non-Judicial Foreclosures
State by state, foreclosures are typically carried out by one of
two common means, each bearing distinct policy motivations. The
non-judicial or "power of sale" foreclosure allows the mortgagee to
foreclose the mortgagor's equitable right to redeem the mortgaged
property without legal action. 51 States that practice this method
of foreclosure have specific statutes outlining the procedures for
selling the property. Commonly, the statutes require notice of
default to the mortgagor. 52 If the defect is not cured, this first
notice will be followed by a notice of sale that is both sent to the
mortgagor and advertised in the newspaper for a specified amount
of time. 53 Unless the mortgagor redeems the loan, the sale or
auction will proceed as per statute. 54 Following the sale, the title
rests in the buyer, and those remaining in the property may be
evicted per state statute. 55
Non-judicial or power of sale foreclosures are typically
practiced in states that follow the title theory of mortgages.56 The
title theory proposes that the mortgagee is conveyed the title to
the property when the mortgage agreement is made. 57 Title is
48. See Stark, supra note 45.
49. See Yzenbaard, supra note 44, at n.69.
50. See id.
51. Stark, supra note 45, at 231.
52. Hon. William Houston Brown, Enforcement of the Mortgage: Default,
Receivership, and Foreclosure-Foreclosure-Power-of-sale foreclosure, THE
LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS DATABASE, Nov. 2008, at § 8:17, available at
DEBTCREDIT § 8:17.
53. Id.
54. See Stark, supra note 45, at 232.
55. Brown, supra note 52.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a (1) (1997).
57. Id.
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subject to defeasance upon complete payment by the mortgagor. 58
The historical development of the title theory is important to
understanding its practical effect today.
The title theory was first conceived in England, at the time
when livery of seisen was a requirement for a conveyance of
property. 59 At that time, the lender would occupy the property
until the borrower paid off the entire loan, at which point the
livery of seisen, as illustrated by the physical gift of the property,
would take place to complete the conveyance. 60 Possession by the
mortgagee was the norm until the middle of the seventeenth
century, when the equitable right of redemption was recognized,
allowing the borrower to possess the property for the duration of
the mortgage unless and until an uncured default occurred. 61
When it became normal for the mortgagor to be the owner in
possession, the mortgagee ended up holding a mere security
interest in the property. 62 So, when a mortgagor failed to perform
the conditions of the mortgage agreement, the mortgagee could
exercise his right to repossess and foreclose the right of
redemption either judicially or by self-help entry onto the
property.63 The newly formed American colonial states adopted
this evolved theory, except that there was usually an express
agreement that the mortgagor would maintain possession, and the
mortgagee would hold a security interest only. 64
The practical effect of the title theory, as explained by its
historical development, is that the "security interest only" theory
is fairly widespread in its adoption, with some statutory variations
state by state. 65 The mortgagee's right to redeem upon default is
still recognized in the form of possession immediately upon an
uncured default. 66 Therefore, in most title states, foreclosure of
the right of redemption is achieved through a non-judicial
foreclosure sale.67 This allows the mortgagee to exercise its very
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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limited right to possession incident to title, and they tend to favor
this means of foreclosure.68
2. Judicial Foreclosure
A judicial foreclosure involves a court action brought by the
mortgagee. 69  By this court action, the mortgagee seeks to
foreclose the mortgagor's equitable right to redeem the mortgaged
property.70 Mortgagors tend to favor this means of foreclosure
because it gives them more notice, time, and possibility to argue
for themselves. 71
Judicial foreclosure proceedings tend to be most common in
lien theory states because of the nature of exercising possessory
interests in lien states. 72 The lien theory basically holds that the
mortgagee holds a 'lien" in the form of a security interest in the
property for the amount due from the mortgagor. 73 Legal and
equitable title remain in the mortgagor. 74  This theory was
adopted by statute as a change to the initially popular title
theory. 75 The lien theory has the practical effect of requiring an
action for foreclosure, because unlike the title theory and power of
sale, the mortgagee does not have a possessory interest in the
property; a court action must be the device that cuts off the
mortgagor's right to possess. 76
Common Notice Requirements
The universal form of notice required in mortgage foreclosures
dictates that the lender inform the borrower that he is in default,
and that the debt is accelerated. 77 From that point on, states vary
on what is required. It is common for the bank to have to notify
the borrower either of the foreclosure sale's details or the action
pending against it in court to judicially foreclose the equitable
68. See Stark, supra note 45, at 232.
69. See id. at 231.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 232.
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a (2) (1997).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. A third, very uncommon intermediate theory of mortgage title
exists. Id. at cmt. a (3).
76. See Stark, supra note 45, at 231.
77. See id. at 232.
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right of redemption. 78  For non-judicial sales, the lender is
commonly required to publish notice of the sale for a certain
period of time preceding the sale, either in a circulating
newspaper or in a public posting place.79  Other than this
mortgagee-mortgagor notice requirement at the end of the
mortgage relationship, there is little else that states can agree
upon when it comes to how and to whom notice is provided.
B. Rhode Island
Title Theory and the Power of Sale in Rhode Island
Rhode Island retains the title theory.80 This preference is
reflected in the state's statutory scheme, which envisions the
property owner granting the lender "fee simple of the mortgaged
premises."81 Thus, foreclosure is achieved by a non-judicial power
of sale.8
2
Once the mortgagee determines that the loan is in default, it
may accelerate the debt, notify the mortgagor of the default, and
unless the default is cured, it may have an attorney begin the
foreclosure process.8 3 At this point, the mortgagee takes title to
the property because the default has gone uncured8 4  The
mortgagee is now the title-holding owner of the property, and the
borrower becomes a tenant by sufferance or a tenant at will. 85
78. See id.
79. Brown, supra note 52.
80. See Houle v. Guilbeault, 40 A.2d 438, 483 (R.I. 1944); Simmons v.
Brown, 7 RI 427, 428 (R.I. 1863). But see 140 Reservoir Ave. Ass'n v. Sepe
Inv., LLC, 941 A.2d 805, 811 (R.I. 2007) (stating that "title theory is a fiction
designed to aid in decision making; it is not an absolute per se rule of law.").
81. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-20 (1956). This presumption takes effect
when the words "with mortgage covenants" are used in real estate
conveyances.
82. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-22 (1956). Note, too, the several other
options existing for the foreclosure to take place: via judicial action, per R.I.
GEN. LAws § 34-27-1 (1956); action for ejectment per R.I. GEN. LAws §34-20-4
(1956); or by peaceable and open entry in the presence of two witnesses per
R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-23-3 (1956). See also John P. Kromer et. al., Rhode
Island Mortgage Lending: Foreclosure, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING:
STATE MANUAL NORTH EASTERN DATABASE, August 2008, at § 2:19, available
at RML-SRNE RI § 2:19.
83. Kromer, supra note 82.
84. § 34-11-20.
85. See Noorigan v. Greenfield, 156 A. 515, 516 (R.I. 1931).
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The first step in the power of sale requires that the bank
notify the mortgagor of the power of sale proceedings. The
mortgagor must be:
mailed written notice of the time and place of sale by
certified mail return receipt requested at the address of
the real estate and, if different, at the mortgagor's
address listed with the tax assessor's office of the city or
town where the real estate is located or any other address
mortgagor designates by written notice to mortgagee at
his, her, or its last known address, at least twenty (20)
days for mortgagors other than individual consumer
mortgagors, and at least thirty (30) days for individual
consumer mortgagors, days prior to the first publication,
including the day of mailing in the computation.8 6
Once this mailed notice has been made, the published notice
required by the first subsection of the statute will be valid.87
Published notice must be made once a week for the three weeks
preceding the sale, with the first publication made no fewer than
twenty-one days before the sale itself.8 8 The notice may include
the address of the property, plus either a metes and bounds
description of the property, the tax assessor's plat information, or
a citation of the book and page on which the mortgage is
recorded. 89
Eviction and Execution
The foreclosure and assumption of title in the mortgagee
extinguishes the mortgagor's equitable right to redeem the
mortgage. 90 The mortgagee may seek to evict those remaining in
the home, including the former owner and his tenants, notifying
86. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-27-4(b) (1956).
87. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-27-4(a).
88. Id.
89. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-27-5 (1956).
90. "Any person entitled in equity to redeem any mortgaged property,
whether real or personal, may prefer a complaint to redeem the property,
which complaint may be heard, tried and determined according to the usages
in chancery and the principles of equity." R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-26-1 (1956). If
the foreclosure was exacted by a judicial action or by peaceable and open
entry, a three-year statutory period exists during which the mortgagor may
redeem the mortgage. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-23-3.
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them that their "tenancy" in his home is over and setting a date by
which they must be out.91 Next, the mortgagee
may commence an eviction action, which may be filed no
earlier than the first day following the expiration or
termination of the tenancy. The action shall be
commenced by filing a "Complaint for Eviction for Reason
Other Than for Nonpayment of Rent," which shall be filed
in the appropriate court according to the form provided in
§ 34-18-56(e). 92
The required summons must follow the format proscribed at
R.I. Gen. Laws §34-18-56(h), and it must give the occupants
twenty days from the date of service to file a responsive pleading,
and it must stipulate that if none is filed, the occupants will have
defaulted in the proceeding. 93 The occupants are given five days
to appeal. 94
If the occupants do not appeal and the judgment is not
satisfied, the eviction will be executed by a constable 95 on the
sixth day after the entry of default judgment. 96 The constable
serves the occupant with an eviction notice, and if this is ignored,
the owner can order a moving company to possess the occupant's
belongings and lock the occupant out of the property, all at the
occupant's expense. 97
Absence of Landlord-Tenant Relationship
Generally, when someone purchases an occupied rental
property in a normal owner-to-buyer sale, the purchaser may
choose whether or not to honor the existing leases, creating a
relationship between the new owner and the former lessees.
98
91. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18-38 (1956), which governs evictions for
unlawful holdovers following the expiration of the term. Mortgagees, and
alternatively, the high bidder at the foreclosure sale, tend to want to evict the
occupants to make sales and occupancy easier.
92. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18-38(a).
93. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18-38(b).
94. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18-48 (1956).
95. Id. See also Lynn Arditi, Eviction, PROVIDENCE J. BULL. (R.I.), June
15th, 2008, at A, available at 2008 WLNR 11423879 (Detailing the duties and
struggles of a state eviction constable).
96. § 34-18-48.
97. Id.
98. Baxter Dunaway, Rights to Possession, Receivers, and Rents After
342 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:328
When there is a mortgage foreclosure involved, the circumstances
change. The landlord-tenant relationship ceases to exist between
the titleholder and the existing tenants when the superior interest
holder (the mortgagee) takes over and extinguishes subordinate
leases and interests, which include rental agreements. 99 Thus,
landlord-tenant law does not traditionally apply in foreclosure
situations, and because the minor interests are extinguished,
there is no legal relationship between the bank and the borrower's
tenants. 100 It is this landlord-tenant relationship and its
attendant statutes that typically govern the termination and
eviction procedures for residential units. 101
Rhode Island laws only refer once to the specific tenancy
situation of banks and former mortgagors and their tenants post-
foreclosure. 10 2 Recall that borrowers become tenants at will or
tenants by sufferance post-foreclosure, with the mortgagee as the
title holding "landlord."10 3 This specific tenancy relationship is
referred to only in the Commercial Landlord-Tenant statute, at
R.I. General Laws § 34-18.1-2, which reads:
Tenants of lands or tenements at will or by sufferance
covered by this chapter shall quit upon notice in writing
from the landlord at the day named therein. 104
While this section of the law applies expressly to the exclusion
of residential properties, 10 5 it is the only statute that refers
Default, Interim Protection for Lenders: In General, LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL
ESTATE DATABASE, Sept. 2008, at § 11:27, available at LAWDRE § 11:27
[hereinafter § 11:27].
99. Id.
100. Aside from creating problems when it comes to honoring and
terminating leases, the lack of a traditional landlord-tenant relationship also
presents problems when it comes to enforcing warranties of habitability or
minimum occupancy standards, especially when it comes to the provision of
essential utilities normally provided by the landlord. For a general
discussion of this problem, see Lynn Arditi, Foreclosures Leave Some Tenants
High and Dry, PROVIDENCE J. BULL. (R.I.), June 19, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 11674890 [hereinafter High and Dry].
101. See generally R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18 (1956) (Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act).
102. Collateral Damage, supra note 9 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18.1
(1956)).
103. See Noorigan v. Greenfield, 156 A. 515, 516 (R.I. 1931).
104. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18.1-2.
105. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18.1-1.
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specifically to the tenancy at will or tenancy by sufferance post-
foreclosure.
Case law has overlooked this caveat and implied that only
this notice is required to remove the holdovers prior to any
eviction action, even those taking place on residential properties.
An 1890 case notes that, under a statute of almost identical
wording, notice is required to the holdovers from the new owner of
the residential property so that the entire eviction procedure
might be avoided if the tenants move out first.10 6 Cases on the
notice statute have held that reasonable notice is required, and
anything from twenty-one days to three days has been held as
acceptable notice. 107 These notices to quit must indicate that they
are being sent from the new "landlord," which is the mortgagee in
these circumstances. 108
It is safe to assume that because this statutory notice
requirement is the only reference to tenants by sufferance or at
will, it is the only notice required of mortgagees before evicting the
borrower. 109 The courts have endorsed this view in their decisions
as noted. So, the notice required to initiate an eviction proceeding
in the case of mortgage foreclosures must merely be "reasonable,"
and this can be as short as three days. 110 This notice, though, is
solely required to the borrower as the holdover tenant. 111 There is
no mention of the pre-existing leaseholders. Thus, the question
arises whether the mortgagee, as the new titleholder, is required
to give the pre-existing lessees any notice. By operation of law,
they have no legal relationship, 1 12 and thus no notice is required
between the two.
106. See Johnson v. Donaldson, 20 A. 242, 243 (R.I. 1890).
107. See Greene v. Walsh, 112 A. 801, 803 (R.I. 1921) (holding that notice
must be reasonable, and that twenty-one days was enough time); but see
Payton v. Shelburne, 2 A. 300, 301 (R.I. 1885) (holding that three days was
acceptable notice while rebutting the notion that notice must be reasonable,
as the statute specifies a day on which to move, interrupting the
"reasonableness" inference). The Payton holding that three days is sufficient
notice under the statute has not been expressly overruled. 2 A. at 301.
108. See Noorigan 156 A. at 516; see also Leite v. Croviero, 89 A. 20, 20
(R.I. 1913) (same).
109. Collateral Damage, supra note 9 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18.1).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. High and Dry, supra note 100; see also § 11:27 ("[S]uch leases would
be extinguished upon foreclosure [...] automatically.").
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C. Summary
To summarize, Rhode Island law follows the title theory of
mortgages, with the mortgagee taking title to the property upon
an uncured default. 113 The foreclosure itself is exacted by a non-
judicial foreclosure sale. 114 The mortgagors remaining in the
home after the mortgagee takes title become the bank's tenants by
sufferance or at will, and are therefore due reasonable notice to
quit before the bank may begin an eviction proceeding; 115 this
notice may be of as few as three days. 116 However, this is all the
law currently requires: there is no legal relationship between the
mortgagee as titleholder and the mortgagor's existing tenants, 117
and therefore no duty to notify the existing tenants of the
foreclosure itself, the sale, or even of the eviction. This is the
place in the law where problems arise for tenants.
The following sections examine potential ways to remedy this
flaw. To prevent the drastic effects on tenants in foreclosure,
mortgagees should be required to notify tenants in foreclosed
homes of the foreclosure sale. However, it is unlikely that the
mortgagees themselves will undertake this policy without some
nudging from the law. Therefore, two avenues to change exist.
First, the courts might interpret the law in a way that recognizes
the tenant's right to notice. Secondly, the legislature could
endeavor to write the notice requirement into the existing law. By
examining these two options, it becomes clear that the policy can
change, and that the problem facing tenants in foreclosure is an
unnecessary burden.
1V. AVENUES TO CHANGE: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
There are two main ways in which the Rhode Island courts
could interpret a notice requirement for the tenants in foreclosure
from existing statutes and legal principles. The first would mirror
113. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-20.
114. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-22 (1956).
115. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18.1-2 (requiring tenants to vacate upon notice)
(emphasis added); Noorigan v. Greenfield, 156 A. 515, 516 (R.I. 1931)
(holding that notice from recent foreclosure buyer demanding tenant vacate
was insufficient because it was delivered by foreclosure buyer without
indication that he was in fact the landlord with the right to evict tenant).
116. Payton v. Shelburne, 2 A. 300, 301 (R.I. 1885).
117. High and Dry, supra note 100.
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a theory adopted in New Hampshire, which considers tenants to
be owners of property, entitling them to notice of foreclosure from
the mortgagee. 118 The second possible judicial interpretation
involves Constitutional principles of notice. 119  Both judicial
interpretations offer valuable insight into notice requirements,
and they both highlight areas that the Rhode Island courts would
need to address in order to read a notice requirement into law.
A. New Hampshire's "Owner in Interest" Approach
New Hampshire law allows for a non-judicial sale, with notice
publication requirements similar to Rhode Island's. 120
Additionally, notice to the mortgagor must be mailed by registered
or certified mail at least twenty-five days before the foreclosure
sale. 121 As it currently reads, the law defines mortgagor as
including:
the mortgagor and any grantee, assignee, devisee or heir
of the mortgagor holding a recorded interest in the
mortgaged premises subordinate to the lien of the
mortgage, provided that such interest is recorded, at least
30 days before the date of the sale, in the registry of
deeds for the county in which the mortgaged premises are
situated. 122
So, mailed notice is required not exclusively to the mortgagor
himself; there are others who may be entitled to notice of the
foreclosure. 123
1. Snyder v. New Hampshire Savings Bank: Lessee as Owner
In 1991, the New Hampshire Supreme Court explored the
"others" due notice under the statute, which then defined
"mortgagor" as including "the mortgagor or the then record owner
of the premises." 124  The differences in the current and then-
current statutes prove to be relatively insignificant in light of how
118. See Snyder v. N.H. Sav. Bank, 592 A.2d 506, 508-9 (N.H. 1991).
119. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S CONST. amend XIV.
120. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479:25 (2008).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Snyder, 592 A.2d at 507.
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the Court interpreted the language.125 As such, its decision has
not been overruled since. 126
Plaintiff, Bio-Energy Corporation, rented a building owned by
Hoague-Sprague Corporation, which was the subject of four
mortgages, held by the New Hampshire Savings Bank
(defendant), the United States Small Business Administration,
Gordon M. Snyder (also a plaintiff), and Walter E. Heller and
Company of New England, Inc. 127 Hoague-Sprague defaulted on
the mortgage held by defendant New Hampshire Savings Bank, so
a foreclosure sale was held per New Hampshire RSA 479:25.128
Papertech was the highest bidder and became the titleholder of
the property. 129 Plaintiff Bio-Energy continued to occupy the
premises following the sale. 130 Papertech served Bio-Energy with
a notice to vacate, which prompted Bio-Energy to intervene in the
action already commenced by plaintiff Snyder. 131
Snyder had already commenced an action in equity to set
aside the foreclosure for lack of notice, arguing that he was
entitled notice under the statute as a lienholder, pointing to New
Hampshire RSA 479:25 for support. 132 Bio-Energy sought to
intervene in Snyder's action, arguing that as the lessee, it too was
a lienholder and that failure to provide it notice invalidated the
foreclosure sale. 133 The trial court denied the motion to intervene,
holding that Bio-Energy was neither a lienholder nor an owner for
the purposes of the relevant statute. 134 Bio-Energy appealed this
decision, arguing that as a lessee, it qualifies either as a
lienholder or an owner. 135 In the alternative, Bio-Energy argued
that if the statute did not entitle it to notice, it was violative of the
due process clause of the United States Constitution. 1 36 The
defendants disagreed, arguing that the statute could not be read
125. Id. at 508.
126. Id. at 506.
127. Id. at 506-7.
128. Id. at 507.
129. Id.
130. Bio-Energy continued to occupy the property through the appeal. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 506.
135. Id. at 507.
136. Id.
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to require notice to the tenants and that this proper reading did
not implicate the due process clause. 13 7
The New Hampshire Supreme Court approached the question
of whether Bio-Energy could intervene, noting that it could if it
was considered an owner in the statute's eyes. 138 The statute's
language was ambiguous, so the Court looked to the legislative
history "for interpretive guidance."'139 Entitling the "then record
owner of the premises" to notice was not determinative, as the
Court's interpretation, following the Restatement (First) of
Property, of the term "owner" encompassed people with "one or
more interests." 140 The statute's use of the word "owner" did not
address the fact that several concurrent interests could exist at
the same time for a given piece of property. 14 1 Thus, the Court
concluded, by indicating that "owners" are entitled to notice, the
New Hampshire legislature must have intended to include all
those with valid property interests, including lessees. 142
Because Hoague-Sprague granted Bio-Energy a leasehold
interest, which is a valid conveyance, Bio-Energy qualified as a
grantee of the mortgagor. Being a grantee qualifies Bio-Energy as
an owner under the Restatement view. 143 Therefore, Bio-Energy,
as the holder of a valid leasehold interest in the property, was
considered an "owner" under the statute, and therefore entitled
notice of foreclosure under the statute. 144
137. Id.
138. The Court did not dispute that lessees have property interests. Id.
139. Id. at 508.
140. Id. The Court cites RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 10, at 25
(1936), wherein "owner" means a person with one or more interests.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 508-09. The court explored the fact that the legislature had
written "then record owner of the premises" into the law in 1979, replacing a
fuzzier statute that entitled "a grantee of the mortgagor" and the holders of
"other encumbrances." The current language actually mirrors that which
was replaced in 1979, as it entitles grantees of the mortgagor to notice. The
Court addressed the fact that deleting the grantee language did not result in
any significant change in the class of people entitled notice, as grantees and
owners were concurrent classes, and therefore redundant. Id. at 508.
143. The current language of the statute encompasses grantees of
mortgagors, therefore the holding is still applicable despite the legislature's
change. § 479:25.
144. Snyder, 592 A.2d at 509 ("As a long-term owner of a leasehold [...]
Bio-Energy easily falls within this class of parties.").
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2. Persuasive Value of Snyder
In holding that lessees are grantees of mortgagors, and
therefore qualify as "owners" for the purposes of the foreclosure
notice statute, the New Hampshire Supreme Court illustrated a
means to entitle tenants to notice without an express legislative
enumeration or change. 145 The New Hampshire statute allowed
the interpretation partially due to its inclusive wording, and
partially because of the Court's receptiveness to the Restatement's
view of "owner."146 Can Rhode Island courts adopt this same logic
when interpreting its own foreclosure notice statutes?
The obvious starting point in assessing the viability of this
avenue is the statutory language itself. The initial notice of
foreclosure required of the mortgagee specifically refers only to the
mortgagor, and no other parties. 147 'Mortgagor" is not specifically
defined in Title 34, the relevant title of the General Laws. The
courts have, in the past, turned to Black's Law Dictionary to look
up ambiguous or undefined terms in question, seeking the
plainest and most commonly accepted meaning of the term. 148
Therefore, the courts would find that Black's defines "mortgagor"
as "[o]ne who mortgages property; the mortgage-debtor, or
borrower." 149 This is a very narrow definition for the purposes of
the Snyder analysis, leaving practically no room to interpret the
tenant as part of this class.
Furthermore, the courts have already implied that in
holdover situations, there is no legal relationship between the
mortgagee and the mortgagor's tenants. 150 Thus, under § 34-18.1-
2, the reasonable notice required from the mortgagee to the
holdover tenants "at will or by sufferance" is only directed at the
mortgagor once again, 151 with no practical means to interpret the
tenants into the equation.
145. Id.
146. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 10 (1936).
147. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-27-4(b) (1956) ("Provided, however, that no
notice shall be valid or effective unless the mortgagor has been mailed
written notice [...]").
148. See Nat'l Refrig., Inc. et al. v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 947
A.2d 906, 910 (R.I. 2008) (turning to Black's Law Dictionary to define an
ambiguous contract term).
149. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (7th ed. 1999).
150. High and Dry, supra note 100.
151. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18.1-2.
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The only definition relevant to the Snyder analysis lies within
the statutory scheme at § 34-18-11, enumerating definitions for
the Residential Landlord Tenant Act. 152 There, the term "owner"
is defined as any person(s) who:
(i) Has legal title or tax title (pursuant to §§ 44-9-40 - 44-
9-46, inclusive, of the general laws) to any dwelling,
dwelling unit or structure with or without accompanying
actual possession thereof; or
(ii) Has charge, care, or control of any dwelling, dwelling
unit or structure as owner or agent of the owner, or an
executor, administrator, trustee, or guardian of the estate
of the owner. Any person representing the actual owner
in this way shall be bound to comply with the provisions
of this chapter and of rules and regulations adopted
pursuant thereto to the same extent as if he or she were
the owner. 153
The key to the Legislature's inflexibility lies in the first part
of the definition, which requires legal or tax title to be owner. 154
To a lesser degree, the second part also illustrates this
inflexibility, as it is unlikely that the mortgagee's lessee will be
considered to be the mortgagee's agent. 155
Based on the statutory language alone, it is unlikely that the
courts will interpret the tenant to be a member of the narrowly
tailored classes entitled to notice. Absent a spark of judicial
inspiration to disregard the statutes themselves, tenants are not
statutorily entitled to notice, nor can they be reasonably read into
the law as it currently stands.
B. Constitutional Inspiration: Fundamental Fairness?
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
notice requirements pertaining to tax sales and mortgage
foreclosures, which should provide the Rhode Island courts with
some guidance. It is worth noting that these cases only really
152. Again, note that the Residential Landlord Tenant Act does not
technically apply to the situation at hand, but that it is just the closest thing
within the statutory framework. High and Dry, supra note 100.
153. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18-11 (10).
154. Id.
155. See 2A C.J.S. Agency § 20 (2008).
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serve an advisory function and do not bind Rhode Island. 
156
1. Due Process Clause
The highest court's decisions have all been based on the
United States Constitution, as interpreted in the previous decision
of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 157 In that
decision, the Court noted that prior to an action which will affect
an interest in life, liberty, or property protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State must
provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to
appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections."' 158 This
rule applied, the Court held that published notice of a trust
settlement action was insufficient to apprise all the beneficiaries
of the pending action, especially since their names and contact
information were readily ascertainable. 159
Almost thirty-five years later, the Court revisited the issue in
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 160 attempting to answer
the question "whether notice by publication and posting provides a
mortgagee of real property with adequate notice of a proceeding to
sell the mortgaged property for nonpayment of taxes." 161 The
state actor in question there was the City of Elkhart, Indiana,
responsible for providing notice in accord with Mullane prior to
the tax sale. 162 In holding that the notice was insufficient, the
Court noted that there were other inexpensive and efficient
156. See infra at p. 26-28.
157. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
158. Id. at 314.
159. Id. at 315, 318.
160. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). For an outstanding analysis of Mennonite's
impact and effect, see Michael H. Rubin & Keith E. Carter, Notice of Seizure
in Mortgage Foreclosures and Tax Sale Proceedings: The Ramifications of
Mennonite, 48 LA. L. REV. 535 (1988) (specifically analyzing the impact of the
ruling in Louisiana, generally discussing the national implications).
161. Id. at 792. Mennonite was the mortgagee, while Adams was the
property owner following the tax sale in question, seeking to quiet title to his
newly acquired property.
162. Id. at 793-94. Elkhart posted and published notice as required by
both Mullane and their own ordinance, and it sent notice to the mortgagor via
certified mail, but it did not provide any notice to Mennonite, despite the fact
that Mennonite's mortgage on the property was, at its inception, recorded by
the City. Id. at 792, 794.
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mechanisms of notice that could have informed the listed
mortgagee of the tax sale. 163
2. Applicability of Mennonite and Mullane to Non-State Actors?
These constitutional principles apply only to state actors. 164
In Rhode Island foreclosure sales, however, no state actor is
involved: the mortgagee gives the notice on its own accord, per
statutory requirements. 165 Despite this seemingly private action,
state laws are used to secure the sale, raising the question of
whether or not this is enough state action or involvement to
trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. 166 The Supreme Court has addressed this
situation as well, holding that it does not. 167
Mennonite relied heavily on Mullane, especially in the
explanation of the fairness involved in providing adequate notice
to those with any property interests. 168 The Mennonite decision
carefully quoted the Mullane decision's reasoning behind its
holding that published notice was inferior to personal or mailed
notice:
Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local
resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the
back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home
outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation
the odds that the information will never reach him are
large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further
reduced when, as here the notice required does not even
name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and
does not inform acquaintances who might call it to
163. Id. at 799-800. "Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure
actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which
will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether
unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are
reasonably ascertainable." (emphasis in original).
164. U.S. CONST., supra note 119.
165. See R.I. GEN. LAWs § 34-11-20.
166. U.S. CONST., supra note 119.
167. Tulsa Prof l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1988)
(holding that private reliance on state sanctions or procedures, without
significant and overt assistance of state officials, does not rise to the level of
state involvement needed to qualify the action as a state action).
168. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 795-96.
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attention. In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of
equivalence with actual notice we are unable to regard
this as more than a feint. 169
This is true regardless of who is posting the notice, whether a
state actor or not. For persons with property interests, whose
names and addresses are reasonably ascertainable, published
notice is practically inadequate for the above-enumerated reasons.
The Court's analysis is instructive on the issue of
fundamental fairness to tenants in the case of a foreclosure sale,
which "may result in the complete nullification of the [tenant's]
interest, since the purchaser acquires title free of all liens and
other encumbrances at the conclusion of the redemption
period."170 There is no reason why a court could not find this
analysis helpful or persuasive, especially in light of Mennonite's
emphasis on inexpensive means of notice to these easily
ascertainable interest holders. 171 So, while the private mortgagee
is in no way constitutionally compelled to provide notice beyond
what is currently required, there is significant rationale for
following the minimum constitutional notice guidelines anyway.
C. Summary: Judicial Interpretation
If tenants are to be entitled notice from a foreclosing
mortgagee, they should not count on the courts of Rhode Island to
read this notice into existing law. The current statutory scheme is
very narrowly tailored, entitling a slim class of people to notice of
foreclosure. 172  Tenants are not members of this class as it
currently stands. While federal constitutional principles are
instructive and tend to favor tenants with property interests,
there is no binding effect of the Due Process Clause's notice
requirements on private mortgage lenders utilizing state laws to
achieve foreclosure sales. 173 If tenants seek notice entitlement,
they should rely on a more proactive approach.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 798.
171. Id. at 799.
172. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 34-27-4(b); 34-18.1-2; 34-18-11.
173. Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988)
(holding that private use of state-sanctioned procedures does not constitute
state action and thus does not implicate the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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V. AVENUES TO CHANGE: LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT
The interests of tenants who risk foreclosure are not entirely
unrepresented in the Rhode Island General Assembly. In fact,
several delegates and interest groups have and continue to
attempt legislative change that would protect the tenants' rights
in case of foreclosure. 174 Most recently, twin bills were introduced
in the House and Senate that would require written notice of the
foreclosure and pending sale from the mortgagee to the
mortgagor's tenants, to be delivered at the same time that the
mortgagor is informed of the foreclosure and pending sale. 175
However, the policy proposal has been "held for further study,"176
which "generally means it's [sic] dead." 177  While the crisis
continues to grow and evolve, it is possible that the bills may be
submitted afresh at the start of the new legislative session. 178 It
may be helpful for legislators, interest groups, and others to look
at a statute that has been successful, learning from its evolution
in order to strengthen or shape a similar statute in Rhode Island.
A. Minnesota's Foreclosure Notice Requirements
1. Historical Evolution of Tenant Notice Requirement
Notice of foreclosure to occupants appeared in the Minnesota
Session Laws as early as 1867 as a required means to supplement
notice published outside of the county in which the property was
located. 179 By 1878, the Legislature had added to the minimum
publication requirement:
In all cases, a copy of such notice shall be served in a like
manner as summons in civil actions in the District Court,
174. High and Dry, supra note 100.
175. H. 7892, 2008 H.R., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2008); S. 2110, 2008 S., Jan. Sess.
(R.I. 2008).
176. See H.R. 2008-LC02194, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2008).
177. E-mail from Robert M. Sabel, Director of Litigation, Rhode Island
Legal Services, Inc. (Nov. 3, 2008, 14:43 EST) [hereinafter Sabel, E-mail] (on
file with author).
178. Id.
179. 1867 MINN. LAws, ch. 74 § 5 p. 120, available at
https://webrhl2.revisor.leg.state.mn.us. Note that this personally served
notice was only required under the listed conditions; if the notice was
published in the same county as the property, no personal service on the
occupants was necessary.
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at least four (4) weeks before the time of sale, on the
person in possession of the mortgaged premises, if the
same are actually occupied. 180
This 1878 language remains virtually unchanged today. 181
2. Current Minnesota Notice Requirements
Prior to mortgage foreclosure, the lender must send the
mortgagor a notice containing foreclosure prevention counseling
information. 182 This notice informs the borrower of his danger of
foreclosure, and advises him as to steps he can take to prevent a
sale from being consummated. 183 This section was added in the
2008 session. 184
In mortgage foreclosures achieved by sale in Minnesota, the
mortgagee must give six weeks published notice, and must make
personal service 185 on the "person in possession of the mortgaged
premises" with the notice of foreclosure sale at least four weeks
prior to the sale. 186 Failure to provide this notice will invalidate a
foreclosure sale. 187
The personally served notice of foreclosure on the occupants
must coincide with the service of a "foreclosure advice notice" to
the owner, explaining his options and rights in foreclosure.188
Absent an action to invalidate the sale within one year after the
sale, failure to provide the "foreclosure advice notice" to the owner
180. 1878 MINN. LAws, ch. 53 § 5 p. 107, available at
https:H/webrhl2.revisor.leg.state.mn.us.
181. MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (2008).
182. MINN. STAT. § 580.021 (2008).
183. Id.
184. See 2008 MINN. SESS. LAw SERV. Ch. 341 (West) [hereinafter MINN.
LEGIS.] (adds § 580.021, with the new form at § 580.022).
185. "[S]hall be served in a like manner as a summons in a civil action in
the district court." See § 580.03.
186. Id.
187. See Ledgerwood v. Hanford, 214 N.W. 925, 926 (1927); see also Casey
v. McIntyre, 48 N.W. 402, 403 (1891).
188. "This section applies to foreclosure of mortgages under this chapter
on property consisting of one to four family dwelling units, one of which the
owner occupies as the owner's principal place of residency on the date of
service of the notice of sale on the owner." See MINN. STAT. § 580.041 (2008).
Note that the section provides the exact format and wording to be used,
ensuring uniformity and lack of confusion. See MINN. LEGIS., supra note 184,
for the most recent revisions.
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will not invalidate the sale on its own. 189  The Minnesota
Legislature has amended this section to add § 580.032, which
requires that a similar notice be served on the tenants in
foreclosure. 190
The third and final current notice requirement in Minnesota
law involves the owner in foreclosure and prospective tenants.
Once a property owner has received notice of foreclosure, he must
take care to limit the terms of any incoming leases on the doomed
property, and he must notify the incoming tenant, in writing, of
the date on which the foreclosure sale is to take place and the date
on which the owner's redemption period ends. 191
3. Copycat Laws
Minnesota's longstanding statutory notice requirements have
made a bold impression on political units as small as cities and as
large as the federal government. On the local level, cities,
including Baltimore, have taken Minnesota's requirements into
account when drafting their own laws. 192 There, the purchaser in
foreclosure is now bound by a statutory requirement to
(1) notify any occupant of the property of the date on
which the writ of possession is first scheduled to be
executed by the Sherriff; or (2) if the Sherriff has agreed
to provide notices of this sort, arrange for the sheriff to
notify the occupant of the date on which the writ of
possession is first scheduled to be executed. 193
The notice shall be both mailed by certified and first class
mail with a certificate of mailing within fourteen (14) days of the
first scheduled date, and posted on the premises at least seven (7)
days before the sale. 194 This is analogous to notice required for
189. Id.
190. MINN. LEGIS., supra note 184.
191. MINN. STAT. § 504B.151 (2008). This section also provides for
circumstances under which the tenant may stay longer with the mortgagee or
new holder's permission. This creates a relationship between the mortgagor's
tenants and the mortgagee/purchaser, allowing the new holder to step into
the landlord's shoes.
192. BALTIMORE, MD. CITY CODE, Art. 13, § 8B-2 (2008).
193. Id.
194. Id.
355
356 ROGER WILLL4MS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:328
eviction, 195 which is common to most states with such a
procedure, but it is special in that it requires not only an on-site
posting of notice, but also mailed notice to "any occupant of the
property."196  Providing notice that is specifically calculated to
inform the occupants (as opposed to the owner or borrower alone)
is close to the personal service requirements contained in
Minnesota law,197 yet they are likely less expensive to implement
and therefore closer to what most cities and states would adopt for
themselves.
May of 2008 saw the introduction of a bill in each of the
United States Houses of Congress, entitled "Protecting Tenants at
Foreclosure Act of 2008."198 Representative Keith Ellison of the
5th District of Minnesota introduced the House version first, on
May 5th. 199 The bill aims to "protect the interests of bona fide
tenants in the case of any foreclosure on any dwelling or
residential real property," much like the Minnesota statute. 200
Specifically, the bill would require that, in any foreclosure of a
residential property, the immediate successor in interest assumes
said interest subject to:
(1) the provision, by such successor in interest of a notice
to vacate to any bona fide tenant at least 90 days before
the effective date of such notice; and (2) the rights of any
bona fide tenant, as of the date of such notice of
foreclosure 201
pursuant to either the tenant's preexisting lease (which the
successor in interest may terminate with notice), a lease
terminable at will under State law, or without a lease. 20 2 These
requirements do not affect "the requirements for termination of
any Federal- or State- subsidized tenants or of any State or local
195. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-38 (1956).
196. BALTIMORE, MD. CITY CODE, Art. 13, § 8B-2(a)(1) (2008).
197. MINN. STAT. § 580.03.
198. See Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2008, H.R. 5963, 110th
Cong. (2008); see also S. 3034, 110th Cong. (2008).
199. See H.R. 5963.
200. Id. "Bona fide" leases or tenancies are such if the "mortgagor under
the contract is not the tenant; [...] the lease or tenancy was the result of an
arms-length transaction; or [...] the lease or tenancy requires the receipt of
rent that is not substantially less than fair market rent for the property."
201. Id.
202. Id. at § 2(a).
2009] NOTICE TO TENANTS IN FORECLOSURE 357
law that provides longer time periods or additional protections for
tenants."20 3 The bill provides special requirements for Section 8
Tenancies, offering amendments to the United States Housing Act
of 1937.204 Since its introduction in May, the House version of the
bill has been referred to the House Committee on Financial
Services. 205
B. Minnesota's Value to Rhode Island Lawmakers
As mentioned earlier, Rhode Island has attempted to pass a
law similar to that in Minnesota, but the Rhode Island version is
not likely to be revived until the next session of the General
Assembly.206 However, what was introduced is very similar to §
580.03 of the Minnesota Statute, requiring that the mortgagee
provide written notice to the bona fide tenant(s), explaining the
default, the date of sale, and the options available to them for
counseling services.207 This proposal, unlike the Minnesota law,
would not invalidate the sale, but it would prevent the successor
in interest from initiating an action for possession of the occupied
unit(s).208 Additionally, in order for the successor in interest to
the mortgagor to recover possession of the bona fide tenant's
occupied unit, he would have to serve a notice to quit at least sixty
(60) days before the named date to quit. 20 9
1. Understanding the Arguments
In order to evaluate what went wrong with the proposal, it
203. Id. at § 2(a)(2)(B).
204. Id. at § 3.
205. Id.; see 110 Bill Tracking H.R. 5963 (Lexisnexis). The Senate version
of the bill, introduced in mid-May, has also been read and referred to the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. See 110 Bill Tracking S
3034 (Lexisnexis).
206. Sabel, E-mail, supra note 177.
207. H. 7892, 2008 H.R., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2008); S. 2110, 2008 S., Jan. Sess.
(R.I. 2008). The Rhode Island measure attempts to address another pressing
issue facing tenants in foreclosure by requiring that the successor in interest
continue to provide the essential utility services that the mortgagor provided
until the tenants quit.
208. H. 7892, 2008 H.R., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2008); S. 2110, 2008 S., Jan. Sess.
(R.I. 2008).
209. This is a large departure from the eviction or commercial landlord-
tenant time period, which hover around twenty or thirty days. See supra
notes 90, 92, 96, 109-115 and accompanying text.
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may be helpful to simplify the positions of the two most obvious
players in the debate: banks versus tenants' rights groups. The
Rhode Island Bankers Association (RIBA or "the Association"),
through their attorney, filed a letter of opposition with the Rhode
Island Senate President, Joseph Montalbano. 210 In its letter, the
Association details several reasons why it opposes the bill,
including its belief that Rhode Island would be the only state with
"restrictions on the foreclosure process such as would result if the
legislation passed. ' 211 Additionally, the Association objects to the
requirement of ascertaining the names of tenants, citing the lack
of a landlord tenant relationship between the bank and the
mortgagor's tenants, and the difficulty that arises when
attempting to get the tenants' names. 2 12 The letter speculates as
to the repercussions for the secondary mortgage market, 213 as
well as the potential for the "statute to chill the ability to sell the
property at the foreclosure sale. Few buyers would be willing to
purchase the property with tenants in place an additional sixty
days of occupancy and requirement to providing utilities. '214
The tenants' rights groups were led by Rhode Island Legal
Services (RILS), who commented on the RIBA letter. 215 This
letter addresses two fundamental problems with the RIBA letter.
First, the RIBA letter commented on an old version of the Senate
210. The letter cited that RIBA's "opposition coincides with the position of
the Rhode Island Mortgage Bankers as well as the Credit Union League."
See Letter from William A. Farrell, Counselor at Law, Brown Rudnick LLP,
to John Flynn, Office of Senate President Joseph A. Montalbano (June 10,
2008) [hereinafte RIBA Letter] (on file with author).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. For a discussion rejecting the idea of a moratorium on
foreclosures to protect tenants, see comments made by Bill Farrell, a lobbyist
for the Rhode Island Mortgage Bankers Association, to the Providence
Journal. See Lynn Arditi, Tenants, Advocates Rally to Stop Foreclosures in
Rhode Island, PROVIDENCE J. BULL. (R.I.), Jan. 15, 2009, at A, available at
2009 WLNR 806991.
214. RIBA Letter, supra note 210. See also Tenant Protection Bill:
Proposed Sub A (on file with author) which cites that the Rhode Island
Mortgage Bankers Association had proposed an alternative 30-day period
within which to quit.
215. Letter from Robert M. Sabel, Director of Litigation, Rhode Island
Legal Services, to Colleen Hastings and Theresa Paiva Weed, Office of the
Senate Majority Leader (June 13, 2008) [hereinafter RILS Letter] (on file
with author).
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bill, 216 which had been outmoded at that point by "Proposed Sub
A," removing requirements for foreclosure counseling services and
a longer pre-foreclosure notification period for the tenants.
217
Second, the RILS letter points out that no landlord tenant
relationship would arise if the bill was passed, quelling the fears
of banks, which understandably do not want to become
landlords. 218 The bill seeks to amend the mortgage foreclosure
chapter of the property title of Rhode Island law, and not the
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, for the very reason of
avoiding the creation of a landlord tenant relationship between
banks and tenants. 219
A core objection to RIBA's position on the potential "chilling
effect" was contained in the RILS letter:
All it really means is the foreclosing bank may get a little
less at a foreclosure sale. Of course, the real problem for
the banks is the vast number of foreclosures coupled
(oversupply) with tightening credit thereby restricting the
number of eligible buyers. [RIBA's] objection also
elevates the foreclosing banks [sic] slight economic hit
over the dispossession of innocent tenants. As we have
read, these foreclosing banks are far from innocent and
their reckless lending practices and mortgage products
are the root cause of the mortgage crisis. 220
The letter goes on to address the "legal responsibility and [.
.] simple decency" that obligate the mortgagees to provide
essential services to tenants preparing to quit. 221
Overall, it is not surprising who came out where on which
issues. Banks do not want to support legislation that makes them
unwilling landlords. They also do not want to increase their costs
to foreclose, especially when the market is failing to being with.
Tenant advocacy groups want to mitigate the inevitable damage
suffered by innocent tenants in foreclosure. It is understandable
that more time for the tenant is more desirable. Is there a point
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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at which the two sides can compromise and the goals of each can
be substantially met? The answer lies in the Minnesota and
Baltimore statutes, as well as the federal proposals.
2. Compromise: The Ideal Tenant Foreclosure Notice
Requirement
The compromised tenant foreclosure notice requirement bill
can ideally serve the best interests of both banks and tenants.
The proposal should seek to give tenants as much advanced notice
as possible to prevent holdover tenancy and foul play by landlords
in foreclosure, all achieved in a reasonably easy and inexpensive
manner that can preserve and protect the banks investment,
namely the property itself. What the compromise should avoid,
though, is any sort of moratorium on foreclosures or breaks in the
process, beyond what is determined by the legislature to be in the
interests of justice and entirely necessary.
A careful examination of the previously introduced bill, the
other statutes in effect elsewhere, and current proposals should
illustrate the direction that Rhode Island policy makers can and
should take to achieve these goals. With five special
characteristics, the ideal compromise should quell both sides and
achieve the goals.
First, the bill should seek to amend the Mortgage Foreclosure
chapter of the Property title of Rhode Island Law. This was done
previously, 222 and it serves two functions. It prevents the
implication of a landlord tenant relationship between the bank
and the mortgagor's tenant(s), 223 which is desirable for several
reasons. The location of the amendment also reinforces the fact
that this is a problem unique to foreclosure situations, and by
locating it in the mortgage section rather than the Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, the waters may remain relatively
unmuddied.
Second, the bill should require that notice of the foreclosure
and pending sale be mailed (certified, return receipt requested) to
the occupants of the property at the same time that the notice
required to the mortgagor is sent.22 4 By requiring the occupants
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-27-4(b) (1956), which requires 30 day notice
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to be mailed notice, banks cannot complain of difficulty of
ascertaining names, nor can they complain of the prohibitive cost
of personal service. 225 It is notice that is reasonably calculated to
reach those who need it. Failure to provide this notice at all
should not invalidate the sale, but it should provide the tenants
with a defense to an overdue move out. If those who need it do not
accept delivery of the certified letter, thus preventing the return
receipt, it may be fair to deem any resultant defenses waived.
Third, Rhode Island policymakers should expand upon
Baltimore's posting policy 226 and require that the lender post
large notices of foreclosure with the date of the sale on the main
ingress and egress points of the home seven days prior to the sale.
Certain requirements for multifamily homes would need to be
worked out to insure that the notices are posted in places where
every tenant will see them. This will act as a second line of
defense for tenants, as it is notice that, if posted in an
unambiguous and prominent manner, is sure to inform the tenant
that the home will be sold in seven days. This method has been
used for other important notices in the state227 and it is less
expensive228 than personal service.
Fourth, the bill should contain a provision mirroring that of
Minnesota's Statute § 504B.151, placing a "restriction on
residential lease terms for buildings in financial distress" and
requiring "notice of pending foreclosure" to prospective tenants. 229
This puts a legal duty on landlords who are aware of their
foreclosure situation to inform incoming tenants of the
ramifications of renting a unit that is in foreclosure. Requiring
landlords to take responsibility for their actions and to provide
for individual consumer mortgagors and 20 day mailed notice to non-
individual consumer mortgagors.
225. See RIBA Letter, supra note 210.
226. BALTIMORE, MD. CITY CODE, Art. 13, § 8B-2 (2008).
227. Posting has become an oft utilized means of notice on both the state
and local levels. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-27.3-123.1.1 (1956) (requiring
the posting of a stop-work notice on job sites); see also, e.g., NARRAGANSETT,
R.I. CODE OF ORDINANCES, Ch. 46, art. II, § 46-32 (2008) (requiring the posting
of public nuisance violation notices for extended periods of time).
228. See C. Jordan Myers, Learning to Live with Jones v. Flowers: A "New
Wrinkle" for an Old Standard, 57 EMORY L. J. 463, 482-83 (2008) (discussing
the cost differences between mailed, personal, and posted notice).
229. MINN. STAT. § 504B.151 (2008).
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minimal disclosure takes some of the onus off of the banks and
places it where it needs to be. Additionally, this portion of the bill
leaves the problem of illegal holdovers to the eviction process, 230
which banks might see as the lesser of two evils if forced to choose
between eviction and a statutorily-required holdover period as was
previously proposed.
Finally, any essential utility provision rider should be limited
to a week or ten days, if included at all. While this is a major
stumbling block facing tenants in foreclosure and an issue that
must be addressed with legislation, it should not necessarily be a
rider to a notice bill. Banks do not want to be, nor should they be,
landlords, 231 and while Rhode Island Legal Services is correct in
saying that provision of essential utilities for holdover tenants is
in the bank's best interest, 232 banks do not see it that way and are
likely to oppose any bill that contains such a rider.233 Therefore,
any utility provision proposal should be introduced as its own bill
or taken up with the Public Utilities Commission. 234 This major
point of contention should not bog down the passage of a tenant
notice bill.
C. Summary: Legislative Change
The best avenue to change for tenants in foreclosure is the
legislative arena. Crafting a bill that would be supported by both
banks and tenant advocacy groups will not be easy, nor is the
proposal contained herein purportedly the most thorough or
realistic: it is ideal. Several factors may come to bear on any
policy proposal, including any political shifts following the
November election, economic bailout packages, 235 or the changing
of the credit market. Regardless of these changes and factors,
something must be done, and the legislative arena seems to be the
most viable means of achieving change.
230. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-38 (1956).
231. RIBA Letter, supra note 210.
232. RILS Letter, supra note 215.
233. RIBA Letter, supra note 210.
234. See generally R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-1 (1956) (enumerating the scope of
powers and rights held by the Public Utilities Commission).
235. H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted).
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VI. CONCLUSION
If blameless tenants like Maria Simmons and Irene Foss want
to avoid being kicked out of their homes when their homes are
sold out from under their defaulting landlords, they have two
options. They can try their luck in the courthouse, or they can
contact their legislators and advocates and propose change. The
courthouse will be a difficult place to air their grievances, because
the law is currently ignorant of their situations. It is the State
House, the representative branch of Rhode Island's government,
which holds the promise for these tenants, and those who will find
themselves on the street in the future. The law can no longer
ignore the tenants in foreclosure.
Careful wording and legislative intent can produce an
atmosphere that equally values tenants and banks. Any bill
should require that lenders notify the mortgagor's tenants of
foreclosure and the pending sale. This seeks to prevent the
problem of holdover tenants from coming to fruition where at all
possible, which is when most problems occur. The banks would
have a relatively low burden for provision of notice, as they
already publish and mail notice to the mortgagor.
As discussed above, the policy that this paper advocates is an
ideal compromise between banks and tenants, and it is not
necessarily only appropriate for Rhode Island's situation. While
its actual reception in the General Assembly or the public cannot
be gauged, it is clear that it is needed. Minnesota is far ahead of
the nation when it comes to tenants' rights in foreclosure, but it is
not likely to remain alone for long. Cities, states, and even the
federal government are examining the need for change in this
region of the law-why shouldn't Rhode Island be at the fore of
the movement?
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